The Challenges of Investigating Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Related
  Crime by Dyson, Simon et al.
The Challenges of Investigating Cryptocurrencies
and Blockchain Related Crime
Simon Dyson
The Cyber Academy,
Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh. UK
Email: simon.dyson@protonmail.com
William J Buchanan, Liam Bell
Blockpass ID Lab,
Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh. UK
Email: w.buchanan@Napier.ac.uk
Abstract—We increasingly live in a world where there is a
balance between the rights to privacy and the requirements
for consent, and the rights of society to protect itself. Within
this world, there is an ever-increasing requirement to protect
the identities involved within financial transactions, but this
makes things increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies,
especially in terms of financial fraud and money laundering. This
paper reviews the state-of-the-art in terms of the methods of
privacy that are being used within cryptocurrency transactions,
and in the challenges that law enforcement face.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mergenovna et al [1] defined the increasing challenges of
investigating money laundering and financing terrorism, as
cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to hide the tracks of
these crimes. Some criminals have even defended their actions
against criminal activity by defining that the transactions were
not of a financial nature [2]. While many current cryptocurren-
cies provided pseudo-anonymous identifiers, several are now
developing anonymisation layers which hide both the sender
the recipient and the cost of a transaction. This anonymisation
will make life increasing difficult in detecting and investigating
a range of crimes.
As we have public blockchains, the strive for anonymisation
in both the transaction and processing is a key element for
protecting privacy and preserving consent. Monero is one
currency which has taken a lead on this, and which uses
ring signatures and stealth addresses. There is also a rise of
anonymised processing, such as with zk-Snarks [3]. These
mechanisms now support the hiding of the core information
of a transaction, but where it is possible to not double spend
or spend more currency that has been allocated to a user.
II. BACKGROUND
In a traditional finance infrastructure, Bob trusts his bank
(Bank A) and Alice trusts her bank (Bank B). A transfer of
funds involves Bob finding out the identifier of Alice’s bank
(such as their sort code) and for her account identifier. The
transfer of funds then involves him informing his bank that
he wants to transfer the funds to Alice (Figure 2). Bob’s bank
then checks the transaction, and if it is valid, his account will
be debited by the defined amount. His bank will then forward
the transaction to Bank B, and where Alice’s bank will credit
her account. In this way, both Bank A and Bank B have a
ledger which can be checked for the transaction. This method
works well in investigating crime, as each bank can report on
Bob and Alice’s transactions, and also if they see any unusual
transactions.
The cyberpunks of the 1990s started to question the re-
quirements for banks to provide the intermediate exchange,
especially in the profits that banks made from the transactions
[4]. Their approach was to use a publicly available ledger -
the blockchain - and then sign for transactions with public key
encryption. Miners could then compete to create a consensus
for the recent transactions and the winner would add a block
onto the blockchain.
Within the Bitcoin infrastructure, Bob and Alice each gen-
erate a private key and then derive an associated public key.
This public key is then used to create a public identification
address for transactions (Figure 1). When Bob now wants to
send Alice some funds, he determines her public address and
then creates a transaction to send her a number of bitcoins
(Figure 3). This is then signed with his private key and then
picked up by miners who will gather together all the other
recent transactions, and create a consensus for the transactions
to be added to a new block on the blockchain. Before this can
happen, the transaction needs to be checked to see if Bob has
enough bitcoins in his account to pay Alice. This checking
is the reason that the transactions need to be public, as the
miners cannot process the transaction if Bob does not have
enough funds to pay Alice.
At the time of the creation of the bitcoin network, there were
no feasible methods which could hide the fact that Bob was
the payer and Alice was the payee. A pseudo-ID is then used
to match Bob and Alice to a public address. While difficult
to match the identifiers, law enforcement can at least trace
is known addresses for their transactions. A worry with this
model, though, is that the funds will never hit a bank account
unless there is a cash out for funds into a fiat currency. This
type of approach thus worries both tax raising authorities and
law enforcement. For this reason, many governments around
the world are now looking to regulate for cryptocurrencies, and
thus provide an opportunity to audit their flows. A concern
would be that it is possible to over regulate, and thus stifle
innovation.
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Fig. 1. Bitcoin address creation
Fig. 2. Traditional banking model
Fig. 3. Basic blockchain process
III. INVESTIGATOR CHALLENGES
A. Introduction
The new challenge for investigators is to understand the
technical process that occurs during the transaction methods
for each cryptocurrency algorithm. This understanding could
range from the difference in the transaction system for Bitcoin-
style systems to the state-based smart contract systems of
Ethereum. The advancement in the methods used also in-
creases the challenge for investigation, as Ethereum moves
towards state channels, Plasma, Sharding, and upgrades to
EWASM (Ethereum flavored WebAssembly) from the EVM
(Ethereum Virtual Machine). There are also a number of
challenges that investigators will need to admit defeat on
and work with companies that have deeper visibility and
resources to solve problems. Chainalysis [5] and Elliptic [6]
are examples of market leaders in the field of cryptocurrency
investigation and monitoring. They use addressing information
that they are able to obtain that is not visible to an investigator
using block explorers and OSINT (Open-source intelligence)
techniques. This information is provided in products they
provide that can point to services where further investigative
leads can be explored. Law enforcement would have to build
bespoke infrastructure to scrape and construct complex data
structures to have visibility of this kind.
The emergence of new crypto-economies is greater than
those of currency and cash out. The ability to buy real estate
or hire property for rentals shows how far this internet money
has come in a relatively short period of time. Purchasing of
consumer goods is possible through direct purchase, inter-
mediaries, gift schemes / Cards, debit cryptocurrency cards.
Although as wildly reported the licence for Wavecrest was
removed by Visa, disabling huge numbers of cryptocurrency
debit card schemes that had allowed transfers of cryptocur-
rency to cards. There are however a number of similar al-
ternatives still available worldwide and are likely to emerge
with stronger KYC (Know Your Customer)/AML (Anti-money
laundering) T&Cs. As projects look to allow cryptocurrency
to pay using applications with nearfield technology the future
will likely see a disruptive innovation take hold [7]. This
already diverse use of assets details only a fraction of the
usage that is possible now and certainly in future blockchain
use cases. Localbitscoins also deals in peer to peer sharing that
offers the exchange models of an online user to online user
but also the ability to meeting in the street to exchange cash
for cryptocurrency. This enables the ability for more users to
become engaged and purchase but it is not without its flaws
as those subject to fraud and deceit would attest.
B. Centralised exchange AML/KYC region
A cryptocurrency exchange generally can be considered a
centralised exchange. This is controlled by a central operator
a business. The exchange will hold the private keys and
allows users to create accounts and pay in FIAT currency for
cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency exchanges range in the ser-
vices that they offer to consumers. In basic terms purchasing
from FIAT, US dollars to crypto (cryptocurrency) and the
ability to exchange one cryptocurrency to another, such as
swapping BTC Bitcoin to ETH Ethereum for a percentage
fee. Many centralised services have more advanced services
built into the platforms either as built-in additional options or
as other products. These additional services mirror products
that are associated with FIAT trading such as leveraging,
margin lending, advanced stop loss and profit taking options.
The exchanges provide advanced graphing and metrics for the
currency pairings.
Exchanges have changed considerably over the last few
years in its adoption of KYC/AML (Know Your Customer
/ Anti-Money Laundering). It was possible to sign up for an
account and cash in and out with very little or no details re-
tained by exchanges other than an e-mail address. Exchanges,
however, are now very large profitable businesses so it makes
sense to apply due diligence and align to similar financial
institutions. The space is unregulated and cryptocurrency has
a shadow of illicit use from Silk road and its early use on
the dark web. The introduction of self-regulation and due
diligence is certainly a step in the right direction as the
industry expands and large financial institutions are investing,
interacting and in some cases, are now operating in the
cryptocurrency financial industry. KYC now generally includes
e-mail addresses, government issued photo id, home utility
bills and often a photo holding the ID. Centralised exchanges
are split into those based in KYC/AML friendly countries with
high standards of AML legislation that will operate to high
standards. Exchanges operating in these areas are aware that
failure to adhere to expected standards will raise the spectre
of compulsive regulation. Centralised exchanges expose the
customers to risk if operated in a reckless manner such as
BTC-E and MtGox. As these exchanges pull in vast amounts
of customers as demonstrated by the relatively new exchange
Binance, announcing higher profits than Germany’s top bank
making 200 million dollars in the same period.
C. Centralised exchange non-regulated area
The non-regulated regions offer the same services discussed
in the previous sections. The difference is that in regions where
traditional money laundering occurs it is highly likely that
these regions will be preferred for crypto laundering. If the
region will not enforce or operate with law enforcement with
international financial institutions then it is unlikely to push
up the standards for this new financial adoption. These regions
will also be influenced by government control, corruption,
influence, destabilised governments or inefficient government
regimes. In the coming years, it will be telling as investigations
unravel across the globe to where the dirty cash falls out of the
system. Will the traditional money laundering regions retain
the higher rates of fraudulent activity.
D. Decentralised exchange
Centralised exchanges hold the private keys for the users so
they are not secure and lack complete control for the user. In
contrast decentralised exchanges offer a service that enables
peer to peer trading without the need for an intermediary
infrastructure. The loss of funds from centralised services
has been observed in a number of attacks from direct theft
from servers to social engineering, phishing, and brute force
password attacks on the user accounts. There are a number of
variations on decentralised exchanges where the infrastructure
and appearance offers a peer to peer trade but would not be
a truly decentralised exchange [1]. There are multi chain peer
to peer trading pairs that allow Bitcoin and Ethereum trading.
True Ethereum / ERC20 token decentralised exchanges are
hosted as Ethereum Dapps and complete the exchange using
smart contacts.
Atomic swaps are cross chain interactions that guarantee
either a safe transaction or complete refund to both parties.
This allows a smart contract exchange that posts a deposit
and then an exchange where both parties cryptocurrency is
contained in the system. This design is essential as there is no
risk to funds from the collapse of the exchange, server breach
or bad actors.
A decentralised exchange can perform the functions of an
exchange trading with the ability to create orders for buy and
sell with advanced features.
E. Swaps, pairs and Shape-shifting
There are a number of services that allow the exchange of
tokens from one to another Shapeshift is one of the largest
services of this type. The service has numerous methods
of exchange from its own web service, partnerships with
wallet providers and merchant services. The service doesn’t
require KYC information identifier or an account it is a simple
exchange. Criminal use of this service is documented in high
profile cyber incidents such as WannaCry and the DAO hack
[8], [9].
There are a number of exchanges that operate these types
of basic trading swap such as Changelly or Coinmotion.
These services operate with low user friction and allow chain
hopping, swapping out from Bitcoin to Ethereum or Monero
for example. This chain hopping is often used to obfuscate and
frustrate law enforcement activity. Shapeshift have however
recently implemented a new membership token that includes
the on-boarding of customers and trading limits for unregis-
tered members. This appears to be more of a move towards a
KYC/AML stance with incentives of better rates and features
[10].
F. Mixers tumblers and fogging
The use of mixers and tumbling services have become
somewhat less popular than at the peak of the Silk Road
market. These are still likely to remain as a constant as
there is a still a requirement by some users to add additional
layers of security and privacy. The effectiveness of mixers is
questionable and certainly is costlier for those users submitting
to these services. There is a number of tumblers and mixers
using different methods to achieve obfuscation [11] [12] [13].
G. Cryptocurrency Betting and gambling
Money laundering has traditionally used betting and gam-
bling in order to place money back into the system to move
as legitimate money. This model is still used in the cryp-
tocurrency and a large number of gambling sites and services.
These include the distribution of illegally obtained funds to
compromised gambling services such as a darknet world cup
gambling ring in China [14].
H. Cryptocurrency (ATM) Automated Teller Machine
There are a number of crypto-currency ATM machine
networks that allow for the debit and credit of cryptocurrency.
These support Bitcoin and a number of alternative currencies
such as Ethereum and Litecoin they are however still relatively
small in number and use.
I. Decentralised market places
There are new emerging decentralised market places that
aim to replace “E-Bay” and Amazon based on decentralised
networks and operating without centralised services. These
new marketplaces offer customers safe peer to peer trading of
goods without dissolving their rights to privacy and targeted
advertising. The purchase of goods through cryptocurrency
offers a genuine distributed purchase allowing the customer
control.
J. Stablecoins
The rise of a number of stable coins now allows the ability
to cash in and out of currencies when the market fluctuates.
This solves a problem that would see ill-gotten gains fluctuate
if remaining in the unstable currency. Previously the funds
would be required to be cashed out quickly to protect the
value of the asset. Stable coins allow the user to bank the
value, the risk then lies with the validity of the asset [15]. If
the stable coin suffers a crash then the value is clearly lost.
K. Privacy
A number of coins are using complex SNARK (zero-
knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge)
and STARK technologies to complete cryptographically strong
transactions. These include value transfers and more complex
smart contract transactions. Zcash and Monero are renowned
for their privacy enhancing algorithms and novel ring signa-
tures. Zcash, however, has seen a decline in the number of
private transactions operated, with most of the transactions
remaining transparent [16]. In contrast, Monero has been
lauded as the criminals go to choice for the privacy-centric
coin [17]. There are a number of reports and instances that
reference Monero but none more impactive than the WannaCry
ransomware attack that hit the NHS causing countrywide
disruption [18], [18].
Monero hides the sender using a ring signature, and the
receiver using a stealth address. A ring signature is a digital
signature that is created by a member of a group which each
have their own keys. It is then not possible to determine the
person in the group who has created the signature. The method
Fig. 4. Ring signature
of ring signatures was initially created by Ron Rivest, et al
2001 [19], and in their paper, they proposed the White house
leak dilemma. To hide the recipient, Bob - who is part of
the ring - initiates a conversation with Victor, after which
Victor will know the address which Bob will use to send the
transaction to. This conversational creates a new private key
for Victor and an associated public address. Bob will then send
his transaction to Victor to this newly created public address.
Victor will then have the new private key which can then be
used to transfer the funds to another account.
1) Creating the ring: In a ring signature, we define a group
of entities who each have their own public/private key pairs of
(P1, S1), (P2, S2),...,(Pn, Sn). If we want an entity i to sign a
message (message), they use their own secret key (si), but the
public keys of the others in the group (m,si,P1...Pn). It should
then be possible to check the validity of the group by knowing
the public key of the group, but not possible to determine a
valid signature if there is no knowledge of the private keys
within the group.
So let’s say that Trent, Bob, Eve and Alice are in a group,
and they each have their own public and secret keys. Bob now
wants to sign a message from the group. He initially generates
a random value v, and then generates random values (xi) for
each of the other participants, but takes his own secret key
(si) and uses it to determine a different secret key, and which
reverse of the encryption function. He now takes the message
and takes a hash of it, and thus creates a key (k). This key
will be used with symmetric encryption to encrypt each of the
elements of the ring (Ek), and then each element of the ring
uses an EX-OR function from the previous element (Figure
4).
Each of the random values for the other participants is then
encrypted with the public key of the given participant. Bob
then computes the value of ys in order to create the ring (the
result of the ring must equal v). He will then inverse this value
to produce the equivalent private key (xs). Bob now releases
the overall signature, and the random x values, along with the
computed secret key. To check the signature, the receive just
computes the ring and checks that the result matches the sent
signature.
L. RingCT
Monero initially adopted the Borromean ring signature
[20], but have since migrated to a new method: Multi-
layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature.
This method hides the transaction amount and the identity
of the payer and recipient. It is now known as RingCT (Ring
Confidential Transactions) and was rolled-out in January 2017
and mandatory for all transactions from September 2017 [21].
For law enforcement, the implementation of RingCT makes
the usage of cryptocurrency transactions increasingly difficult,
as they hide both the sender and recipient of the transaction.
IV. THE SOLUTION?
Our current financial infrastructure has existed for centuries
and integrates with global and national financial regulations.
A key focus for these regulations is often around anti-money
laundering (AML), gathering taxes, and in the detection of
financial fraud. Financial organisations must thus report on
suspicious transactions, or where there are investigations on
customers. Within a cryptocurrency world, there can often
be little traces of financial transactions, and this is a major
concern of many governments and law enforcement agencies
around the world. Some criminals have even defended their
actions against criminal activity by defining that the transac-
tions were not of a financial nature [2].
In the blockchain ecosystem, there are significant efforts to
anonymise cryptocurrency transactions, which include cryp-
tocurrencies such as zCash and Monero. This anonymisation
is required with the rise of public blockchains and the in-
creasing regulatory requirements for privacy and consent on
the blockchain. Current methods of anonymisation include the
usage of ring signatures and stealth addresses. The solution
to this problem is to increasingly focus on anonymising the
blockchain layer, but to map regulatory and statutory envi-
ronments on top of the anonymisation layer, and which will
provide audit trails with the revealing of the mapping from the
regulatory layer into the anonymisation layer. In Figure 5 we
see an anonymised layer within the blockchain infrastructure
and where the transaction sources and destinations are hidden,
but the upper-level layer is then defined where real identifies
will then be mapped into the anonymised infrastructure. The
investigation would thus happen at the upper layer, and where
the regulatory infrastructure in a country would define that all
transactions would be logged from an anonymised identity to
a real identity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The strive for anonymisation within the blockchain infras-
tructure will continue, and thus the long term goal must
be to start to regulate for the mapping of real identity into
Fig. 5. Regulatory mapping
anonymised ones. The software which produces the trans-
actions will thus have to keep a track for the mapping of
a sovereign identity to anonymised one. Only with strong
cryptography can we make sure that this is implemented in
a trusted way.
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